This is a guest post from leading Palestine solidarity activist Kevin Ovenden.
What means this war?
The response from Western capitals and their allies to Israel’s latest war on Gaza was as expected.
There was no hand-wringing about a “no-fly zone” to protect civilians; no cliched demarche from Paris calling for “humanitarian corridors”; no emergency London or Doha conference to agree “non-lethal” defence supplies to the people of Gaza; no total or even token sanctions on Israel; no calls for Binyamin Netanyahu to step down; no media castigation of the “regime” in Tel Aviv; no arms or billions in largesse flowing from Western allies in the Persian Gulf and Turkey to those fighting an illegitimate, murderous aggressor.
Instead, there was full-throated support for Israel. Britain’s Foreign Secretary William Hague led the pack in laying “principal responsibility” for the aggression on its victims – the Hamas government in Gaza and those who elected it. His subsequent advice that Israel risked “losing international support” through a ground invasion merely indicated the West’s preferred parameters for this bout of slaughter.
All predictable, perhaps wearily so. Why then rehearse this litany of hypocrisy? Because if we become inured to it, let it stand as a harsh fact of life in a cynical world, then unwittingly we allow the West and its allies to shift the narrative in the Middle East, to frame events and to determine which questions will be asked and which buried. And not just there.
That has been a central aim in Washington, London, Tel Aviv and the rest for the last 12 months as they attempt both to grapple with a region that is in a process of long-term profound change and to manage their equally long-term decline.
It is almost exactly a year ago that Palestine was last at the centre of official international attention, when Palestinian Authority President Abu Mazen pushed at the UN Security Council for the recognition of a truncated Palestinian state. Voted down by the US and its allies, he is set to make the same bid at the wider UN General Assembly, where there is no great power veto, at the end of this month.
But in those 12 months, Palestine was off the agenda – as Israeli settlements expanded, the siege on Gaza continued and the apparatus of apartheid deepened. So much so that when Netanyahu visited the US earlier this year to rally the pro-Israel AIPAC conference and nakedly boost the fundamentalist Republican election campaign against Barack Obama, he was able to get away with barely mentioning the word “Palestinian” whilst agitating for war on Iran and seeking to bend the outcome of events in Egypt, Syria and elsewhere to Israel’s and the West’s advantage.
The return of Palestine (which didn’t go away from the minds of those genuinely driving change in the Middle East), as so often through massacre and tragedy, lays bare the true fault-lines and course of development in the wider region. It illuminates also the manoeuvres to subvert progressive change and to distract us – which have preoccupied the Empire since the fall of Hosni Mubarak nearly two years ago.
Israel and US decline
The proximate reasons for Israel’s Operation Pillar of Cloud are interlinked and reasonably clear. At the end of October Israel bombed the Yarmouk factory in Khartoum, Sudan, accusing it of being a staging post for the supply of Iranian missiles to Hamas and other resistance organisations in Gaza. Of course, the standard Western government and media portrayal of some kind of equivalence between Israel, a nuclear-armed state with the fourth most powerful army in the world backed by the most powerful, and the Palestinians, occupied, besieged, exiled, without an airforce or air defence and with the most minimal of arms, is risible. And we are told from reliable reports that far from escalating confrontation and triggering the war, Hamas was in fact seeking a truce with Israel when its military commander, and close ally of leader Khaled Mishaal, Ahmed al-Jaabari was assassinated, signalling the start of the war.
Nevertheless, the arrival of rockets such as the Fajr-5 in Gaza is of considerable concern to the Israeli state. It means, as the last week has shown, that Israel’s assault on Gaza, while overwhelming, is not entirely without response. Air raid sirens have sounded in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. An Israeli public, promised that the 2006 war on Lebanon and the 2008-09 war on Gaza would leave them safer, faces the reality that the security balance is shifting even as they have state of the art shelters and the Dalou family, all but wiped out in an Israeli raid on their apartment block in Gaza, had nowhere to hide in the world’s largest open air prison camp. Crushing or disciplining resistance in Gaza has a politico-military logic for Netanyahu – especially as he presses on towards military confrontation with Iran and wants to pre-empt any fighting response from the Palestinian territories and from Lebanon. He has been frustrated from forcing through the bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities this year and before the US presidential election. His cartoon performance at the UN two months ago, however, signalled a determination to bring things to the boil by next spring. Unable to lash out at Iran or directly against the resistance in Lebanon after Israel’s defeat in 2006, the caged Palestinians of Gaza provide a convenient target for a barbaric “demonstration effect” of Israel’s power.
The message is clear – despite the changes in the region, we can still do this. We are serious about a greater Israel and “solving” the “Palestinian problem” on Egyptian and Jordanian territory, with the apartheid infrastructure of occupation taking most of the West Bank into an expanded Israel. It is a message for domestic consumption. Netanyahu faces a general election in January. The fusion between his Likud party and the ultra-right Avigdor Lieberman did not produce a poll bounce. It is a message to the Palestinians, including Abu Mazen as he plans to go to the UN and is increasingly desperate in the face of settlement building, the ethnic cleansing of Jerusalem and the bankruptcy of the Oslo process. It is aimed at Arab capitals – especially Cairo. And it is addressed to Washington, where even Obama’s craven support for Israel does not have the required zealotry of Netanyahu’s friends on the Republican right, who were rejected in the presidential and Senate elections. It’s a gambit that shows every sign of backfiring, as in 2008-09 and 2006. Ceasefire talks this week could not avoid the calls to lift the six year siege on Gaza.
This isn’t the first time an Israeli prime minister has flayed the Palestinians – pour encourager les autres. In 2001, following 9/11, George W Bush toyed with the call for Palestinian statehood and a renewed peace process. It was window dressing to garner support for the impending wars on Afghanistan and Iraq. Israel’s Ariel Sharon responded with a massive military incursion into the West Bank and Gaza. Israel was going to make no compromise even to assist its benefactor’s war drive.
Israel remains at the centre of the US establishment’s – both Democrat and Republican – calculus of control in the Middle East. Washington provides unique access to weapons and billions of dollars of subventions to Tel Aviv – and the EU and Britain give preferential trading agreements – because it is calculated as in its interests to do so. The pro-Israel lobby does not determine those interests or high policy. But it does exert a vice-like grip on policy discussion to sideline alternatives, and their bearers, which might loosen the relationship with Israel and its right wing for the purpose of securing a broader, more stable set of alliances in pursuit of Persian Gulf oil. Keeping its hand on that spigot remains vital to US strategic policy. Even as it tries to reduce its own dependence on foreign oil, it still wants to control the supply to others, such as China, whose economies cannot function without it. The Israeli tail does not wag the US dog. But an ageing dog can lose full command of its faculties.
The grand gamble under George W Bush and the authors of the Project for the New American Century a decade ago did not pay off. The war on Iraq resulted in weakening the US position in the Middle East, a deep and persisting decline of militarist public opinion in the US and Europe, and the strengthening of Iran in Iraq. The Afghanistan war is lost. Western prestige is falling and the political costs mounting alongside the rising Afghan and Nato death tolls and the destabilisation in Pakistan.
But it would be a foolhardy mistake to read off from that either the impotence of US-organised imperialism or the prospect of pacific development in the Middle East, where those striving for progress would have the space to skirt around the rocks of occupation, military aggression and foreign interference. Changing the Middle East without confronting state power, great and local, as it were.
First, the US remains immensely powerful – militarily more powerful than the next 19 states together, many of them its allies in any case. Its presence in the Persian Gulf is entrenching – in Bahrain and Qatar. Perversely, that is not Washington’s strategic intention, which is rather to concentrate military deployment encircling China. The doctrine is outlined in the Pentagon’s “Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for a 21st Century Defense”. It’s forced to maintain direct deployment in the Middle East because the second limb of policy to manage upheaval and relative decline is unreliable. It is more dependent on proxies and allies in the region. They have their own distinct interests. So Israel and Turkey, a member of Nato, are both close allies of the US. Turkey is no longer a simple client of the US. A decade of AKP rule by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erodgan and his foreign secretary, Ahmet Davutoglu, has meant a policy of putting the interests of Turkish capital first. But it remains a close, though more independent ally, and is pitching for the role of US suzerain in the Levant. The problem is that Israel already sees itself as the regional power. Turkey has ambitions which clash with that. Both have conflicting interests over, for example, the future of Algerian-levels of natural gas reserves discovered under the sea between Lebanon, Israel and the divided island of Cyprus. The tensions persist even as Erdogan seeks a tight fit with the US and Nato. So the story of Washington’s response to armed conflict in Libya and more so Syria is not simply of reluctance to intervene directly in conditions of circumscribed power. It is also one of relying on allies who have their own aspirations – Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the Gulf Cooperation Council. This is not a recipe for ending direct Western intervention – as Libya and the moves to cohere a pro-Western political leadership in Syria demonstrate. It is certainly not a prelude to less war in the Middle East.
There is a parallel with the US response to its greatest ever imperial defeat: Vietnam. The victory of the Vietnamese people encouraged forces of liberation everywhere. It did not mean that a wounded US imperialism tiptoed from the stage, leaving others to play the principal. There followed a new doctrine of intense re-engagement though allies, state and others, overt and covert. The Contra war in Nicaragua; the strengthening of support for Israel after the US presence in Lebanon was forced to a close by the loss of 241 of its soldiers in 1983; the arming of Saddam Hussein against revolutionary Iran; the disastrous meddling in Afghanistan to back favoured sons of the mujahideen; the second Cold War, with the stationing of Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe directed against the then main strategic competitor, the Soviet Union, upon whose collapse there followed the 1991 Gulf War and a resurgence of direct US interventions throughout the late-1990s. The cycle culminated in the full-blown occupation of Iraq in 2003.
For sure, there are major differences between the position of the US three decades ago and today (though the sanctimonious Western baiting of Russia and China at the UN over Syria is redolent of 1980s Cold War rhetoric, as is the stationing of a missile “defence shield” in Eastern Europe and Turkey). The most obvious difference is the re-emergence of revolutionary upheavals across the Middle East/North Africa region. In 1979, the US lost a pillar of support with the fall of the Shah of Iran. Three decades later, and despite billions of dollars of support, it lost Mubarak.
Response in the Arab region
Anger and shame in Egypt at the complicity of the Mubarak regime in the oppression of the Palestinians, particularly in Gaza, was at the centre of the movement that tore him down. It was the Al Aqsa Palestinian intifada a decade ago which led to a generation of young activists breaking the stranglehold of the Egyptian security state and taking to the streets for the first time in many years. Rage intensified at Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in 2008-09, during which Mubarak sealed the border with Gaza while – let us never forget – pledging along with every other Arab president and prince undying love for “our Palestinian brothers”. A fresh generation faced the ugly triptych of neo-liberal dislocation, national humiliation at their country’s prostration to imperialism and a police state viciously repressive in proportion to its declining legitimacy. That powered the great upsurge of protests and strikes that went on to topple Mubarak, in the wake of Tunisia’s Ben Ali. Underlying those movements are deep shifts in Arab societies, and in the configuration of imperial power. It is not only that these transformations are processes, rather than simply events (a journalistic commonplace now). They are likely to be drawn out over many years. Many Arab historians identify the start of a new epoch in the region. That’s why it is a mistake – understandable from those who continue to experience declining living standards and repression in the Middle East – to imagine that what Western journalists called the Arab Spring has ended, to be replaced not with a glorious summer but by a seemingly permanent winter of dispossession. Equally, to imagine that the movement would simply surge forward and rapidly transform everything, or to exaggerate what has changed, is to underestimate the resources of the other side, their tenacity and the critical political junctures the movement continues to face. Operation Pillar of Cloud poses one such juncture for those fighting for democracy in Egypt, Syria and elsewhere: is this to be done alongside those bombing Gaza, or against them? The answer from the popular masses in Syria and in every Arab state is already known and is resounding. But the same people know from their own bitter history that unfortunately popular sentiment and principle are not automatically reflected in the politics of those who rise to the top – in fact, they rarely have been.
Compared with 15 years ago, the position of Israel and of its Western backers is demonstrably weaker. Then Israel could look to two treaty-allies on its frontline – Jordan and Egypt – an ongoing, though faltering, occupation of southern Lebanon, and a Syria that was contained, almost a Cold War relic which had recently joined the US-led assault on Iraq, then the strongest Arab state.
A lot has changed, but much has not. Saudi Arabia (the oldest US Arab ally), Qatar and the regional capitalist hub represented by the Gulf Cooperation Council states have been pivotal in muting the response to Israel’s aggression on Gaza. Naturally, there have been words. It is easily forgotten, however, that strong words came from all of them, and from Egypt’s rulers at the time, in 1982 over the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, over the first intifada, the second intifada, the siege of President Arafat in Ramallah, Operation Cast Lead… No Arab leader can do anything other than rhetorically boast he is with the Palestinians “until Jerusalem”. The emir of Qatar promises reconstruction aid for Gaza, while hosting the US Centcom base, a keystone of US, and by extension, Israeli military might – which is… flattening Gaza. They cannot be judged on words. At all. Ever.
Their actions are to suppress, cajole or crush the militant heart of the movement which is best exemplified in Egypt. So they have systematically repressed the movement in Bahrain over the last 12 months, with the full support of the West. British prime minister David Cameron earlier this month toured Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. He was selling arms and grovelling his apologies to the House of Saud for a rare, critical British parliamentary report on the total absence of human rights in the kingdom. He cemented the recent military agreement with Bahrain, home to the US Fifth Fleet. All this while Cameron and the kings posed as champions of democracy in Libya and Syria. The nauseating hypocrisy is summed up by Britain’s William Hague. Six days into the assault on Gaza, which as a great friend of Likud he backs above and beyond the call of his office, he proclaimed that the British government would now recognise the latest umbrella group of the Syrian opposition. It’s the one which the West – Britain and France above all – has with Gulf allies spent months ensuring is safely politically aligned. If they get their way, the fruit of the appalling fighting in Syria will be a government still more amenable to the West. We expect the Western media and politicians to fall silent about their double standards. The movement in solidarity with the Palestinian people and with the mass of Arabs cannot.
Wiping Palestine off the map of public concern as thoroughly as it was wiped off the geographical map in 1948 has been key to Western and Gulf efforts to redirect and redefine the “Arab Spring” over the last 12 months. That has gone hand in hand with the direct suppression of the movement in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, and with the effort to usurp and bend political forces from Libya to Syria and Egypt. The strategy has had some success. Until now. Until the renewed Israeli aggression on Gaza, which provides a moment in which the central issues are again clarified.
The process is concentrated in Jordan. Last week tens of thousands of protesters broke a taboo and the law by calling for the fall of King Abdullah (the monarch, who rules by sole virtue of being his father’s son but who with no hint of irony said last year that Syria’s Bashar Al Assad lacked “democratic legitimacy”). The protests and strikes over fuel hikes in Jordan began on the eve of Operation Pillar of Cloud. Israel has an embassy in Jordan, where two thirds of the population are expelled Palestinians. The tripartite treaty and security arrangements between Israel, Jordan and (still) Egypt are central to Tel Aviv’s capacity to hold down the Palestinians. Fear of an Egyptian-style confluence of rising social discontent and heartfelt support for the Palestinians led Abdullah to cancel a visit to London in order to manage the crisis on Saturday as protests intensified. Part of his arsenal of response was, along with other Arab leaders, to call for a ceasefire and to issue a verbal fusillade against Netanyahu. He and they were licensed to do so. Words. Words – while the embassy of Israel and the mutual treaty stayed in place. Words while Jordan’s secret police host the CIA to train those approved by Israel to serve in the Palestinian Authority’s security forces, containing the incipient Palestinian spring in the West Bank and Jerusalem.
Egypt and Turkey
The venue for the ceasefire negotiations was Cairo, where President Mohamed Morsi on the one hand recalled Egypt’s ambassador to Tel Aviv and on the other received warm praise from Washington and London for his “mediation efforts” between Israel and Hamas. Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood is not only closely linked to Hamas, which has moved through Cairo to normalise relations with Doha, Riyadh and other Arab capitals. The Brotherhood also stakes much of its claim for legitimacy on pan-Islamic solidarity to recover Palestine. Of course, by the standards of political leaders in Britain, where I’m writing this from, the recall of an ambassador from Israel is a huge step forward. But Morsi came to office in Egypt thanks to the revolutionary overthrow of Mubarak. The yardstick is very different. What may be lionised in Britain is lamentable in Egypt. Throughout the Israeli assault on Gaza restrictions have remained in place at the Rafah crossing with Egypt. The argument from Morsi and from the Brotherhood since his election has been that caution is necessary – a balancing act – so as not to provoke the still powerful Egyptian military or Western powers, who warily see the Brotherhood as a force they are obliged to do business with, rather than one they would have freely chosen. Egypt has just secured a loan from the International Monetary Fund, with the customary attendant neo-liberal conditions. Now, no friend of the Egyptian people would relish war or a reckless military confrontation with Israel. But we are not talking about some preemptory abrogation of the Camp David accords between Israel and Egypt at a moment when Egypt would be isolated and seen to be inviting reprisals. We are talking about the moment when Israel launches its biggest aggression against Palestine since Mubarak sat idly by (while telling us he was praying for Gaza) four years ago. If not now, when? Operation Pillar of Defence has produced significant protests in Egypt, including from Muslim Brotherhood members. A gathering of parties, among them the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, called for action, rather than words, from Morsi.
His election run-off against the candidate of the SCAF military council this year produced a division in the revolutionary movement in Egypt. First there was a liberal argument – echoed by sections of the historic left – that the Muslim Brotherhood, indeed Islamist forces generally, are simply reactionary, as much an enemy of the mass of the population as the military junta which hankered for continuity with the Mubarak years. At the extreme end were pro-Western liberals or social democrats who openly said they preferred the “secular”, military-backed Shafiq to the “Islamist” Morsi. A second, more difficult, argument was among those who rightly do not equate the Muslim Brotherhood with the military, but who differed over the tactics of whether to boycott the election or to vote for Morsi in order to stall the direct attempt by the military to roll back the revolution. I believe that the narrow victory of Morsi and the course of politics since is a vindication of arguing for the defeat of Shafiq in the election, which meant favouring the victory of Morsi, against the understandable feeling of overwhelmingly young, urban revolutionaries to boycott the election in the name of radical street action against all the old conservative faces.
Be that as it may. The point for all the radical wing for the Egyptian revolution was what were the best tactics to propel it forward. It was about how to go beyond the chronically cautious, vacillating Brotherhood leadership and how to defeat the move by Western powers to limit the changes to a parliamentary/presidential facade, behind which Egypt’s role in the region would remain little changed, as would the position of working people, peasants, the poor and the oppressed at home.
The assault on Gaza and the tepid response from the Egyptian government provide a moment when radical revolutionaries can aspire to do just that: to win broader layers to the radical goals of the revolution as workers and the poor continue to resist at home and the government’s vaunted Islamic solidarity stands diminished abroad. The divisions among the Brotherhood over Morsi’s performance mean that the genuine left can pose a militant way forward alongside those disappointed with Morsi – in common initiatives.
This is so not only in Egypt. Turkey, under Erdogan’s AKP Islamist government, has issued strong words against Israel, calling it “a terrorist state”. Erdogan and Davutoglu have been at the centre of steering the “Arab Spring” towards an outcome in their own image, a kind of Islamic version of European Christian Democracy.
No one can doubt the sincerity of the mass of Turkish people, religious and secular, in their support for the Palestinians. Those of us who were aboard the Turkish Mavi Marmara ship attacked by Israel two years ago will forever attest to that. Erdogan also issued strong words against Israel in 2009, during Cast Lead. But since his “just one minute” speech at the Davos summit in Switzerland nearly four years have passed. In that time, and despite diplomatic spats, trade between Israel and Turkey has increased 60 percent to $4.4 billion. That provides a significant portion of Israel’s foreign earnings. It is exactly the vulnerability identified by the global, Palestinian-led Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. But there are no Turkish economic sanctions on Israel. Erdogan is on the point of requesting extra missiles from his Nato partners. They are not to protect the Palestinians or even theatrically to wave at Israel. They are for pointing at Syria, as the border tension between the two countries escalates and Turkey wishes to play kingmaker in Damascus.
The US, Britain, Europe and the war at home
Suggestions and observations from those in the West to friends in the Middle East are cheap – in fact worthless – if they do not flow from and are subordinate to building a serious movement in the heart of the Empire. There is a long tradition of “progressives” in the West refusing to oppose or giving tacit support to their states’ war machines in the name of “liberating” people from only carefully selected “despots” in far off lands. It may indeed be inadequate for one Middle Eastern foreign minister after another ritualistically to visit Gaza under bombardment. But the US and British governments are not inadequate. They are self aware and irreplaceable backers of Israel. They are participants in this war. The EU foreign minister Catherine Ashton, with the war criminal Tony Blair as Middle East peace envoy, was despatched not to Gaza under bombs, but to the West Bank. There they sought to pressure Abu Mazen not to push recognition at the UN.
The Western public response to Israel’s attack on Gaza has been angry. In most countries support for Israel continues to fall. But those of us active in the West must be honest: we have a very long way to go. The ease with which the British media and political class supported this aggression on Gaza shows that. Too easily and too often have we allowed Palestine to be sidelined over the last 12 months. Too readily have some of us not singlemindedly honed in on the crimes of our own governments. Failing to do that allows greater space for them to sow confusion and division; falsely to pose as liberators; to redefine the public perception of the Arab Spring as a movement directed mainly at those at odds with the West, while our allies are supposedly quietly reforming. And our core allies in the region are spewing an ethnic-religious poison against “Persians”, “Alawites” and Shia minority Muslims in a sickening reheating of Sykes-Picot divide and rule. That poison has entered the veins of even some in Britain’s Muslim communities. While the venom weakens the body, the ideological barrage softens the mind. Few may buy the brazen trickery of Israel’s venerable war criminal Shimon Peres, who claimed last year that he welcomed the “Arab Spring” as it represented, he said, an overdue, pro-Western modernisation of the Middle East, directed against the “old politics” of “Hamas, Hezbollah” and Arab nationalism. But the more we allow Palestine to be glossed over, the easier it is for all those who wish to derail the movements to rid the Middle East of all foreign domination and of corrupt rulers, and who manipulate the better part of the feelings of Western citizens, mostly prey to the media corporations.
The return of revolutionary events to the Middle East did not mean that the struggle against imperialist interference ended. It meant that that struggle could be refounded on mass, revolutionary movements. There is every reason to stand with mainly young people in the Middle East facing over a century of dismemberment, disfigurement and disillusion with those who have promised to solve it. There can be no excuse in the imperialist states for mature movements not to confront systematically and in all fields our governments. The century-long foreign domination of the Middle East is weakening, thanks in no small measure to the continued resistance of the Palestinian people. Tensions and conflicts in the US-organised hierarchy of control are mounting. But there is still a hierarchy of control. It is that which defines the problems it faces, not the other way around.
Britain, post-Suez, has been wedded as a junior partner, an adjutant to the US. When Cameron’s government backs Israel in deed and not just word, helping to arm it, covering for it at the UN, when it props up the Gulf dictators and seeks to usurp the future of the Syrian and Arab people more generally, then these are not simply Middle Eastern questions, the subjects of theoretical debate or ideological elucidation. They are British political questions.
Three generations ago several leaders of what would become successful anti-colonial liberation movements spent time in London: it was the capital of the biggest empire. Gandhi, Kenyatta and others, discussed with Labour Party people, the Independent Labour Party, Communists, Fabians and more besides. They did not look to progressives in Britain primarily for an organised discussion about politics in the Indian subcontinent or East Africa. Principally, they sought out people here who would construct a movement that could help lift the Union Jack-boot off the necks of people in the two thirds of the globe then run from London.
Britain’s despicable support for the latest war on Gaza shows why a movement and political principles opposed to contemporary imperialism remain vital. Keeping Palestine as “the issue” is central to that movement. It embraces the welcome reality that globally for tens of millions of people, especially young people thirsting for change, Palestine has become the symbol of the world struggle of the oppressed against the oppressor, the exploited against the exploiter – as Malcolm X used to put it. Palestine is also a loadstone. Real progress in the Middle East, in deeds not empty words, brings the liberation of Palestine closer, not more distant.
The change from Operation Cast Lead in 2008-09 or the war on Lebanon two years earlier is not only in the Middle East. It is in Europe and north America. Here, now, we are in the throes of a long economic crisis. Austerity grips the US, Britain and Europe in a way that was only dimly discernible on the horizon when Israel killed 1,417 Palestinians four years ago. The stakes for the old imperial powers are very high. So too for their people.
In addition to the considerable minority who were already moved to side with the Palestinians, there are many others in Britain who ask or who can be encouraged to ask – why should we stand with Cameron behind Israel’s shooting war on the Palestinians, when it is Cameron and his Etonian millionaires who are at economic and social war with us? As austerity bites deeper and domestic support for the government withers, then foreign imperial adventures are all the more risky. Ensuring that the risk is realised requires an unswerving focus on the duplicity and crimes of our rulers, intensifying every argument against them through whatever actions we can muster with broad support. With a British government in occupation of Afghanistan, a belligerent in Gaza and at war against us at home this is not a distraction. It is the most meaningful thing we can do in solidarity with those resisting in Palestine and across the Middle East.
Greece is the European country hardest hit thus far by the economic war of the rich against the rest. There have been many demonstrations, strikes and electoral battles by the left over the last four years. On the annual commemoration of the Polytechnic Uprising against the military junta in 1973, a massive demonstration unsurprisingly took to the streets of Athens on Saturday, 17 November. There were many excellent candidates for where the march should go to, given the manifold domestic and international tormentors of the Greek people today. The demonstration, three days into the assault on Gaza, chose to go the Israeli embassy in Athens. To its credit, on that evening at least, the Communist Party contingent argued with the police that its permit for that route should also include everyone else who wished to protest against the outpost of the Zionist entity in solidarity with the Palestinians. The anti-capitalist left and the bulk of the demonstration did wish to; they marched there together.
It was more than a gesture of solidarity, splendid alone as that would have been. The governments of austerity Greece, a member of Nato, have drawn increasingly close to Israel over the last two years. In striking at that pact and for the people in Gaza, the Polytechnic demonstration revealed a political intent for a radical break with all the filth of Western capitalism and imperialism.
Internationalism is not simply support for those elsewhere; it is the beating heart of a truly radical politics at home. And the meaning of this latest Israeli war? More war and imperialist meddling are to come. Alongside them, further upsurges and resistance. And for those of us who resist – Palestine is still the issue.
Kevin Ovenden
London
20 November 2012
andy newman on said:
Great article Kevin.
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Mark on said:
Very good. This, among other things, is very much worth noting and understanding:
“Gandhi, Kenyatta and others, discussed with Labour Party people, the Independent Labour Party, Communists, Fabians and more besides. They did not look to progressives in Britain primarily for an organised discussion about politics in the Indian subcontinent or East Africa. Principally, they sought out people here who would construct a movement that could help lift the Union Jack-boot off the necks of people in the two thirds of the globe then run from London.”
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jack ford on said:
The Union Jack boot was ultimately responsible for the destruction of Palestine of course. Labour back in those days tended to be Zionist it was only after 1967 that support for Palestine began to grow on the left.
If in 1967 Israel had simply annexed East Jerusalem, given Israali citizenship to the Arabs of East Jerusalem and handed the West Bank back to Jordan and Gaza to Egypt Israel would almost certainly be recognised by all the Arab states by now and the conflict would have been resolved. However that’s academic now.
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redscribe on said:
A very interesting, very good article.
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Andy Newman on said:
BUt it is a good point you make, illustractive of the fact that Israel does not desire peace.
Another opportunity they had was in 1954, when Nasser secretly offered peace to Israeli premier Moshe Sharrett, on the basis of recognition of the 1948 borders in exchange for better compensation for refugees. The Israelis responded by the so-caled Lavon affair – a clandestine terror bombing campaign against US and UK targets in Egypt – to scupper peace
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Deirdre Campbell on said:
brilliant piece of journalism Kevin – well done
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Noah on said:
Excellent analysis.
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SA on said:
Very good article, couldn’t fault it.
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John on said:
Very interesting article on the Guardian website on Iranian role in Palestinian resistance from Gaza.
A couple of key quotes from the article attributed to the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Ali Larijani:
“We are honoured that our help has material and military aspects, and these Arab countries that sit and hold meetings should know that the nation of Palestine does not need words or meetings.
“Our message is that if Arab countries want to help the nation of Palestine they should give military assistance.”
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/21/iran-supplied-hamas-missile-technology
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John on said:
Btw, very good analysis Kevin.
This ceasefire is a victory for Hamas and Palestinian resistance in general, though again at great cost in Palestinian blood, innocent blood at that.
But the inability of the Israeli war machine to deliver Hamas and the resistance in Gaza in general a definitive knockout blow has again exposed the increasing limitations of Israel’s much vaunted military deterrence.
Too, this time round the fact that sirens were heard in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem for the first time in a conflict with the Palestinian resistance is a massive psychological game changer, both for the Palestinians and Israeli society.
Netanyahu’s military gamble has failed. It will be interesting to see the resulting political fallout in Israel over the following days. He cannot claim victory and without it the political capital he’d hoped.
Increasingly, Israel appears a giant with feet of clay. The increased ability of the Palestinians and Lebanese to resist and resist longer, thus forcing the Israelis to resort to more extreme and disproportionate force, with its concomitant impact in civilian casualties, combines with international pressure to place a constraint on the latitude Israel is allowed when it comes to maintaining the status quo of dispossession and oppression of the Palestinians close to home and regional hegemony overall. The lack of a land invasion of Gaza reflects this new dynamic.
Clearly, it is becoming harder for western leaders to provide Israel with the political support and cover it has relied on for so long. The shift in public consciousness in the West when it comes to Israel, and the upsurge in sympathy of the Palestinians, is becoming a key factor when it comes to Israel’s limited military options.
For all Hague, Cameron, and Obama et al. have made the same pro-Israel statements over the past 8 days, I’ll wager the private conversations with the Israeli political leadership have not been as supportive.
Things have changed.
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Funky Joe Stalin on said:
This is a strange conclusion. Did you want to see a ground Operation? A ‘knockout’ blow would have involved Israel levelling Gaza, like the Russians in Chechnya or the Assad regime levelling Aleppo, or the type of strikes the Turks are throwing at the Kurds.
Israel refrained. Be careful what you wish for.
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Kevin Ovenden on said:
Thank you to all for the positive comments. The thrust of the article was to look through this moment back at the positives and weaknesses of the last phase and forward, identifying what I feel are some key strategic beacons in what is going to be an ongoing struggle. We are at a new phase, this is not a new struggle.
As for change – for sure, there has been great change and it is continuing. But all has not changed. And it will not be further changed without agency.
I’m reminded of some words by Walt Whitman – the situation “is unformed and is between things ended and things begun”.
Now – a forceful demonstration on Saturday in London, and in other places, is still necessary, for all the obvious reasons. And a reflection on how we are to proceed is required even more.
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John on said:
Of course I didn’t want to see a ground operation.
But Israel’s only way of destroying Hamas is to destroy Gaza. It can’t do that. International pressure would not allow it. This is the point I’m making. This is undoubtedly an aspect of the upsurge in sympathy for the Palestinians in the West, creating a schism with the political classes when it comes to the conflict. It also reflects a decline in the effectiveness of the Israeli PR/propaganda machine in recent years.
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John on said:
Of course not, Kevin. I never said that all had changed. I also understand the role of agency.
We aren’t novices here.
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Kevin Ovenden on said:
It wasn’t a response to you, John.
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Stuntman on said:
Why do you have to be so argumentative John? It really puts people off from contributing.
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John on said:
Really?
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John on said:
I hardly think there’s a massive constituency of ‘people’ refusing to contribute on Socialist Unity because I can be argumentative, the same as everyone else who contributes regularly on here.
Don’t be daft.
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Kevin Ovenden on said:
Yes – really, John.
Now please stop.
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Omar on said:
Really good article, Kevin, and a much-needed palette cleanser after that ridiculous Challenge article that was posted here yesterday. Honestly Andy,WTF were you thinking?
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jack ford on said:
Maybe I’m being over optimistic but I think Israel made a big mistake with the butchery of Operation Cast Lead and upset a lot of people in the West. The mask is beginning to slip and people are waking up to what the Israelis are doing. The fact that Hamas managed to hit Tel Aviv and Jerusalem means that the likes of Netanyahu might be wary before committing another such aggression.
I’m convinced that the main reason Syria is being targeted has nothing to do with democracy and human rights but is because it is part of the Axis of Resistance alongside Iran and Hizbollah.
Saudi and Qatar pretend to be friends of the Palestinians but it is only Iran and Syria that have had the courage to defend Gaza in any meaningful way.
The United States is a declining power and China is a rising power. There is a military alliance between Russia and China who between them have the potential to form a bloc with a combined economic and military power equal to the West. It will most likely take a generation or more before the Empire is no longer able to guarantee immunity for the apartheid state but I do believe Zionist Israel is doomed in the long run.
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listen? on said:
I struggle to understand, how or why anyone would want to hear Tony’s opinion on the Israel-Gaza conflict. How can someone who spends all day down a dark underground tube, on a grossly overpaid wage,thousands of miles away from the conflict, who has probably never even been or lived in the conflict zone…speak about it as if he is a know-it-all expert.
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Jellytot on said:
@20….that ridiculous Challenge article that was posted here yesterday. Honestly Andy,WTF were you thinking?
I thought the ‘Challenge’ was a good and interesting article and SU should be commended for posting it. There is a danger at times like these to dispense with critical faculties. I also noted Andy’s comments about Fatah with interest.
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Kevin Ovenden on said:
@ 22 – That’s brilliant. I’m trying to think who has done this spoof: Tony, is it you? In any case, well done.
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Omar on said:
Jellytot,
Sorry,JT,I disagree. I thought it was a transparent attempt to discredit Hamas at a time when solidarity is needed.
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John Grimshaw on said:
This commentator has obviously never been down the tube late on a Friday or Saturday night.
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jock mctrousers on said:
Well, I couldn’t really quibble with anything in Kevin O’s piece – yes, that seems to be what’s going on, right enough. Very good.
Just one thing. You could have got four good sized posts out of that one.
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Zaid on said:
A not unrelated elephant in the room…
Suppose earlier this month Romney had won the US presidential election instead of Obama, and events in Gaza had gone on to unfold in exactly the same way. What would people on this blog have been saying? Those of us who argued there was no fundamental difference between the Obama and Romney would have come in for an absolute torrent of ridicule – “NOW do you believe it would have made no difference if Obama had won?” would have been the taunt. The temptation to believe that the brutal assault on Gaza took place BECAUSE Romney won would have been overwhelming. I imagine it would have been very difficult, even for me, not to have a few doubts.
Nevertheless, it was Obama who won, and Gaza was still attacked. I therefore invite everybody to reflect on this and draw whatever conclusions they feel appropriate.
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Vanya on said:
#28 For all we know the assault could have been worse had Romney won, and/or lasted longer. Or involved a ground invasion. Or maybe it wouldn’t have happened at all or so soon because Israel did this to test out Obama.
Who knows? Any assessment as to the merits of Obama winning rather than Romney can hardly be made on the basis of one episode.
I didn’t believe that Obama would suddenly reverse US foreign policy. I’m not sure how many of those on the left who supported him reluctantly against Romney did either.
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Zaid on said:
Vanya,
That is not the point I’m making. I’m asking you to imagine, honestly, what you would have been saying if this attack had taken place in the context of a Romney victory.
You would certainly NOT have been saying “the merits of Obama winning rather than Romney can hardly be made on the basis of one episode” if, in fact, Romney had won and the assault on Gaza went on to take place as it did. You would have been saying “we told you so”.
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jack ford on said:
My view is that US support for the apartheid state is a constant that is not affected by whether Republicans or Democrats occupy the White House.
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Vanya on said:
#30 I’m not sure what I would have been saying. As I pointed out, I had no illusions that an Obama win would result in a reversal of foreign policy. It didn’t the first time, so why should it now?
And if I don’t know myself I’m pretty certain that you don’t
!
The fact remains that particularly the hawkish elements of Israeli public opinion were behind Romney. There was a reason for that and given the everyday links that so many Israelis have with the USA I doubt this was out of ignorance.
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SA on said:
28-32
If we assume one of the principal reasons for the attack on Gaza at this time was internal Israeli politics and the upcoming election that does not preclude Netanyahu wanted to push the boundaries of a second term Obama.
There has been speculation that Obama who cannot run again might act outside of the constraint placed on the POTUS by the Israeli lobby. That’s one of the reasons the more rabid Zionists supported Romney. I’m sceptical of what Obama might do in that regard but many seemed to believe it.
As it turns out Israel mobilised for a ground war and then stepped back. Why it did so is open to speculation and what occurs to me is:
Maybe Hamas have enough proper weaponry to mean the level of IDF casualties would have a negative impact in the election.
Maybe Obama said not now, think of the bigger picture.
Maybe Turkey and co. said Egypt cannot sell this and nor can we.
Whatever was behind it Hamas emerged with greater credibility.
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John Grimshaw on said:
#28 etc. The point here is surely that both the Republicans and the Democrats have no relationship with the the USA working class. Therefore frequently in terms of what they actually do its difficult to put a cigarette papr between them. Some on the left delude themselves that matters are otherwise. Israel would’ve have preferred Romney but of course they can make do with Obama. Even if (even if?) Obama wanted to be different the whole of the US military establishment is not going to allow it.
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John on said:
Both parties draw much of their support from working class Americans – the Republicans predominately the white working class, the Democrats minorities.
The problem with the US is that most working class people don’t even realise they are working class, and certainly don’t identify themselves as such. Many consider themselves rich people in waiting or proud, patriotic Americans who believe in the eternal righteousness of the Constitution.
This is reinforced by the mantra of middle class American pushed by both parties. The fact it’s a mantra that enjoys traction is testament to the genius of the myth of the American dream in US society.
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John Grimshaw on said:
#33 in terms of “Real-Politik” one difference from the the past is that Turkey’s relative power is growing.
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Jellytot on said:
@32The fact remains that particularly the hawkish elements of Israeli public opinion were behind Romney.
One of the main benefactors of Romney was the multi-Billionaire Sheldon Adelson who is passionate in his support for Likud in Israel. During the GOP primaries Adelson had supported Romney rival Newt Gingrich, who, to please his main backer, stated that the Palestinians were an invented and fictitious people
@35The problem with the US is that most working class people don’t even realise they are working class
Yes, it’s an oddity that the term “working class” has almost been entirely expunged from the US public discourse. Most media commentators will refer to the “Underclass”, “Middle Class” and “Upper Classes”. Even very pro-Labour/Union media personalities like MSNBC’s Ed Schultz will run stories supporting the collective bargaining rights of union members in the Mid-West under the strap-line “Defending America’s Middle Class”.
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David Ruaune on said:
“There was no hand-wringing about a “no-fly zone” to protect civilians;”
Brilliant. That line alone is worth a thousand articles by the mainstream journalists. I like Kevin Ovenden.
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Morning Star reader on said:
Reports of protests in Israel against Israeli aggression, and statements from the Israeli CP and allies and the Palestinian People’s Party, can be found at http://maki.org.il/en/ There are also links to videos of the protests.
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Kevin Ovenden on said:
Morsi acts swiftly on his boost of the last seven days (this is from the FT):
“Mr Morsi ordered the reopening of all cases relating to attacks on demonstrators – a move aimed at absorbing anger on the streets, which has led to a fresh eruption of unrest and fighting between protesters and police this week.
“But he combined this decision with far more controversial measures, including forbidding the courts from disbanding both the controversial panel drafting the constitution and the Shura council or upper chamber of parliament elected last year [and]… dominated by Islamists from Mr Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood”.
A populist feint, then a move attacked by right, liberals and left. The left’s critique is distinct, and must be made distinctively. But it must be made. The point of electing Morsi was to defeat the military; not to end the story with Morsi.
A section of the left, in most countries a minority, rightly rejected in the 1990s and 2000s the idea that Islamism was uniquely reactionary, a monolithic incipient theocratic dictatorship – the leftist/intellectualised version of common or garden Islamophobia
Understanding the contradictions of a mass organisation encompassing different class and social groups and with different political strands like the Muslim Brotherhood, however, is *not* the same as imagining it is consistently left wing, anti-imperialist or anything similar.
Some people are getting far too carried away with the fact that Israel’s war demonstrated its limitations in the current Middle East, boosted the position of Hamas and strongly boosted the position of Morsi.
Of course it’s good that Israel was frustrated and that there is a renewed sense of defiance in Gaza.
But it is very worrying to see from people who should know better Morsi’s manoeuvres being described as a “shift to the left” – presumably under a combination of popular pressure and his enhanced standing allowing a radical Morsi to emerge, the radical Morsi that has been in hiding inside the balancing, tightrope walking Morsi of the last few months.
Shift to the left? It is nothing of the kind. A populist shimmy to cover a serious arrogation of powers that be will used against the left and other opponents.
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Cliff Moore on said:
Zaid,
What a great point you have made!
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Karl Stewart on said:
Kevin, very thorough article on the situation.
I’d say the courage and fighting spirit of the Gaza people has been tremendous and much to be admired.
Successfully repelling Israel has been an astonishing achievement and it makes it that much harder for Israel to invade in the future.
What I’d like to ask you Kevin is what’s your take on how this leaves the overall Palestinian struggle for statehood?
The way I see it, Gaza is strengthened, in relation to Israel, but the West Bank appears weaker – Israeli incursions into the West Bank continue, along with illegal settlements, land grabs etc.
Do you see Hamas starting to gain strength in the West Bank too, at the expense of Fatah?
Or do you think a Hamas-ruled Gaza and the West Bank under Fatah will just continue to diverge further – to become more and more as two completely separate entities?
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John Grimshaw on said:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20458148
That Morsi has announced these constitutional changes directly after his “success” in Gaza should tell us all we need to know.
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Kevin Ovenden on said:
@42 Thanks, Karl.
Here are a few thoughts on where I think it leaves the Palestinian struggle. I should say that it is far too early to make a comprehensive assessment of what this latest war means in the region, so these are sketchy general observations. (And I’ve left out entirely what it means in Israel – the general election will be an important indicator.)
1) Friends in Gaza, from across the spectrum, report a great sense of defiance in withstanding the Israeli assault and in the prevention (however it happened) of a ground invasion. Hamas has been boosted internally. People in Gaza do have a genuine sense of “victory”.
2) Hamas is boosted externally. Even more so, Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. (See my point above).
3) There is as a result now enormous pressure on Abu Mazen to see through his UN bid. There is massive counter pressure from the US, Israel and EU to drop it. I haven’t got time to go through why they take the move so seriously – but one reason is that it would give a UN-recognised Palestinian state access to various international legal avenues that non-state actors do not have. The British government changing War Crimes law in order to lift the possibility of arrest of Tzipi Livni and others shows how mindful they are of the consequences.
Incidentally – I entirely understand why many good friends on the Palestinian left opposed Abu Mazen’s move last year. I agree with much of their analysis of his motivation. I also agree that there is a great danger – perhaps even intention – to eclipse the Palestinian National Council as the representative body of the Palestinian people. That would threaten the Right of Return and other fundamentals, and even 1967-borders. But, I do think, particularly in the West, that it is right to make those arguments from the standpoint of backing the Palestinians at the UN and opposing the US et al. When virtually the whole of Latin America, the global south and China backed the bid, and the US, Britain, and the worst of the EU states opposed it – I think I know where I want to stand.
All that is fairly common sense, almost trivially so. But there are other less remarked upon factors as well.
First, there has been for some years now a rising trend of radicalisation among particularly young Palestinians – on the West Bank, in the camps, in exile and under difficult circumstances in Gaza. They have been raising the Right of Return and the historic Palestinian claim. It is born out of frustration with Oslo and with “all the old leaders”, though almost all the friends I know have no difficulty in distinguishing the abject surrender of someone like Fayyad from the continued preparedness to resist of Haniye in Gaza or Mishaal. One aspect of the generational break is that this sentiment finds only a limited reflection in the more militant Palestinian factions, such as Islamic Jihad and the PFLP (though both of those have been gaining in support).
It is fuelled by disgust at corruption in the West Bank and, naturally in the last two years, by identification with the same generation in revolt in Egypt and elsewhere. There is an ongoing major battle in Jerusalem, for example, which is subterranean for all corporate media in the West. There is a sense in the West Bank and in Jerusalem above all that the clock is ticking – if there is no breakthrough, the city and much of the West Bank will be lost. That is the sense. I’m not saying that is what will happen. One reflection of that reality on the ground is the increased talk – sometimes in ways and from quarters that are not of the left – of a “one state” solution.
But among the young people and the fresh Palestinian forces this is certainly of the left. People will remember the tens of thousands of Lebanese and Palestinian people, mainly young, who went to the border at Maroun al Ras on Nakba Day last year, where six of them were shot dead by the Israelis and dozens were wounded. The Palestinians were from families of all the factions and across the spectrum of Palestinian society – a large number from traditionally Fatah families. All six who were killed were in their teens or twenties. Three were from Ain al Hilwe camp.
It is this sentiment and generation that powered and leads the global call for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions – and sets its programme of demands, which is incompatible with Zionist apartheid in historic Palestine as a whole. That is why Norman Finkelstein chose to oppose it, unfortunately with his acerbic, sharp intelligence lashing a part of the movement and not the Israel and its friends, which he does so well.
This factor is also growing – as anyone who speaks to the many young Palestinians and young Arabs on demonstrations in London or elsewhere in the West knows.
Secondly, the historic factions are not monolithic. I don’t for obvious reasons want to get into too much detail or to identify people, but there are different trends and currents within the major organisations. Hamas is of course united in the face of Israeli aggression. But there is an ongoing strategic debate in Hamas – expressed in many ways, including over the succession to Khaled Mishaal. Is Hamas, which was founded as a Palestinian expression of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (the different Brotherhoods in the Middle East are tightly connected ideologically and theologically, but unsurprisingly reflect their own national political realities) essentially just that? Or is it an Islamically-inflected inheritor of the wider Palestinian national revolutionary struggle?
Remember, the position of Hamas in that struggle has changed enormously since the first intifada. Until the fall of Mubarak, it didn’t really matter how you answered that existential question. With the advent of a Muslim Brotherhood administration in Egypt, it does. And so the debate continues. It informs tactical differences. Should Hamas pursue reconciliation and unity (of government administration) with Fatah? There is a groundswell for unity. Unity would certainly be a step forward. But some friends caution that it can also be a path to unnecessary trimming of the sails. The question people ask is – what is the unity for?
Conversely, a go-it-alone strategy by Hamas does not necessarily entail a more principled and militant stance. Friends also caution against the idea of de facto running Gaza as a confederal province of Egypt, sundering the connection with the West Bank – as a stage, of course, on the path to the recovery of Palestine as a whole. But we all know that every proposition must be described by every Palestinian leader as a stage and not the end goal. And look where Oslo ended up.
While the break of the diplomatic isolation of Hamas in the region – it was formerly welcome only in Damascus, Khartoum, Tehran, Beirut, etc – is welcome, everyone knows that to become dependent on Riyadh or Doha brings a very high price. Saudi Arabia and Qatar don’t simply meddle. Others do that as well. The issue is, in whose interests do these allies of the US – which have relations with Israel – meddle.
None of these questions has an easy answer and none of the choices are black and white. That’s why debate will intensify.
There is also debate in Fatah. Though I understand why people who support the resistance of the Palestinians praise Hamas and castigate Fatah in toto, it is far true crude. There is an historic left in Fatah, led by the incarcerated Marwan Barghouti. There are also differing trends in the Fatah leadership. The very worst and most corrupt elements broke with Abu Mazen. Mohammed Dahlan, the Fatah commander in Gaza who was armed by the West to destroy elected Hamas in 2007 through a coup, has gone. He has gone with probably three quarters of a billion dollars and now owns a large chunk of the Adriatic coast of Montenegro.
Just as in Hamas, the political and ideological trends animate the tactical decisions of Abu Mazen and others in Fatah.
Thirdly, there is the regional balance. That depends on not only on the immediate fallout from the war but also on internal developments in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and indeed across the region. It also depends on how Israel and the US decide to act on what is an absolutely central and fixed policy – weakening Iran and preventing even the possibility of a fundamental shift in the military balance. That is also an obsession of the Saudis, Qataris and the Gulf Cooperation Council which is now both the regional hub of capital accumulation (not simply oil exports), and of counter-revolution as a serious force in the US-organised imperialist hierarchy.
It is far too soon to see how all of that plays out, as it is too soon to see how forces will play out in Egypt, which is critical.
I’m sorry if that is somewhat schematic. I think the main point I am making is that it is important to follow the actual course of debates, discussions and events in the region.
That is additional, of course, to the central point I made in the article to a British or Western audience: that our argumentation and action needs to be bent around both the responsibility of our own state and also the political necessity of our movement, the labour (lower case “L”)/left/progressive/working class movement, taking up these questions in a way that weakens our opponents here and strengthens our friends abroad.
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redscribe on said:
John Grimshaw,
Is this not the same Mubarak-era constitutional court that ruled half of the candidates who wanted to stand out of the Presidential Election. Did it not also try to dissolve the new parliament straight after it was elected?
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18439530
Is this a confrontation of a dictatorial president with the popular movement, or a confrontation of an elected leader with people who are in effect part of the military that tried to cling on to power after Mubarak was overthrown?
Genuine question.
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Feodor on said:
Almost, but not completely: it’s quite common to hear cops described as ‘working class’ in American discourse, as well as firemen and mailmen.
I don’t now how a coal miner or steelworker is generally described – ‘blue-collar’ perhaps? But there is a distinct tendency towards denoting certain types of service-based and/or state-funded occupations as working class, though I don’t think this extends to teachers or soldiers.
And moreover, while I’m sure there’s a quite fundamental point that could be drawn from American discourse’s peculiarity in this regard, I don’t know what it is!
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Andy Newman on said:
Paradoxically, the term “working class” is most likely to be referred to unashamedly in Country Music
One of the most interesting books I have read about American culture is Bill C Malone’s “Don’t get above your raisin’ – Country Music and the Southern Working Class”
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Kevin Ovenden on said:
@45 It’s both. I know that sounds glib, but I think it is both.
You’re absolutely right about the court. But, the measures Morsi took also lock out left and progressive elements from drafting the constitution. Christian and liberal members of the committee have walked out. The left has argued for something like a constitutional assembly to draw up the basic law.
So it is a move against both wings, with an instrument – presidential decree – which arrogates power to the post of president, without any new constitution in place defining legally what those powers are. It’s neither simply a popular plebeian sally to forestall the old Mubarak elements, nor simply a Sadat-style prelude to presidential dictatorship.
That makes it very important for the left to have an independent position and find ways in which it can win to it forces both from the secular, liberal wing and from the Islamists who were disappointed with Morsi’s performance during the war and with other things.
Of course, I’m in no position to say how that should be done. But that is what friends in Egypt are saying should be done.
Tactically, these things are very hard and very concrete – the experiences of Peronism in Argentina and Khomeiniism in Iran show that in different ways.
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Molotov on said:
Excellent article. Well done to the author and Socialist Unity
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Vanya on said:
#46 In ‘Goodfellas’ Karen Hill describes her husband and his wise-guy ‘colleagues’ as ‘blue collar’ meaning working class. It always stuck in my mind that.
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tony collins on said:
Following on from Kevin’s excellent article above, he’s now expanded some of his responses into a new article here
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Vanya on said:
#48 Interesting analogies.
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Kevin Ovenden on said:
@49 Thanks, Molotov.
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